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FROM CAUSE TO RESPONSIBILITY: R2P AS A MODERN
JUST WAR
ZAMARIS SAXON*
AND

LARA PRATT**
Abstract
This article examines the relationship between just war theory and the modern principle of responsibility
to protect (R2P). In the absence of the principle’s clear use as a justification for the use of force, this
article considers two situations which prompted debate about the applicability of the principle - the UN
Security Council authorised no-fly-zone in Libya in 2011 and the decision not to use force in Syria in
2012. The article’s core message is that the debates about R2P suggest that rather than view R2P as a
‘new’ principle of international law, it should be viewed as a modern incarnation of the historic principles
of just war. The just war criteria of ‘just cause’ and ‘proportionality’ remain the guiding standards by
which an exercise of R2P will be judged. R2P remains a developing principle and, the absence of state
practice in this area means that states wanting to intervene to protect foreign populations from atrocities
are left without clear legal justification for such action. In the absence of UN Security Council
authorisation, use of force under the banner of R2P remains contentious. In the absence of a clear legal
status, consideration of R2P’s just war origins in the context of recent discourse is helpful in
understanding when such force may be legitimate.

I

INTRODUCTION

Acts which are now labelled as ‘genocide’ and ‘crimes against humanity’ by the modern world1
are not confined to the annals of history. The general prohibition on the use of force, found in
the Charter of the United Nations (‘UN Charter’), sought to protect humanity from the ‘scourge
of war’ and ensure that military force would not be used ‘save in the common interest’.2 The
UN Charter therefore confined the use of force to a limited number of exceptions.3 Such
exceptions have proved insufficient in responding to and preventing atrocities. Responsibility
to protect (‘R2P’) is the latest international development which attempts to respond to and end
such occurrences.4 R2P encompasses a wide range of possible actions including aid, early
warning mechanisms, other non-military measures designed to compel compliance, and at
times the use of force.5 R2P as a legal justification for military intervention to bring an end to
such atrocities, particularly in the absence of United Nations Security Council (‘UNSC’)
authorisation, however remains controversial.6 This article places R2P within the context of
*
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1
See Ben Kiernan, Blood and Soil: A World History of Genocide and Extermination from Sparta to Darfur (Yale
University Press, 2007).
2
Charter of the United Nations, preamble.
3
Charter of the United Nations arts 2(4), 51.
4
Stevie Martin, ‘Sovereignty and the Responsibility to Protect: Mutually Exclusive or Co-Dependent?’ (2011)
20(1) Griffith Law Review 153, 153-4.
5
See Report of the Secretary-General - Early Warning, Assessment and the Responsibility to Protect, UN GAOR,
64th sess, Agenda Items 48 and 114, UN Doc A/63/864 (14 July 2010).
6
See, eg, John Janzekovic, The Use of Force in Humanitarian Intervention: Morality and Practicalities (Ashgate,
2008) 103. See also Jackson Nyamuya Maogoto, Battling Terrorism: Legal Perspectives on the Use of Force
and the War on Terror (Ashgate, 2005) 124 ff, for a concise discussion of the retaliation/anticipatory self-defence
arguments put forward by the US in 2002/3.
**

135

(2015) 17 UNDALR

just war theory and suggests that, while the absence of sufficient state practice and clear opinio
juris leave the legal status of R2P-motivated military action unclear, such action can be located
in the long history of just war. Consequently, just war provides a framework for understanding
where R2P military action may be legitimate.
The primary justification of R2P relies on the acceptance that if modern state-sovereignty is
limited rather than absolute, then the guiding principle of non-intervention may be overcome
upon a state abusing its citizens. Whilst individual states can intervene without the imprimatur
of the UNSC, such as when it is deadlocked or hampered by political machinations, such
intervention must still comply with the original just war framework. This is one of the offered
interpretations of the R2P principle.
The alternative justification, unrelated to sovereignty, suggests that a state’s use of force
without UNSC approval fulfils a secondary responsibility to international peace and security
under the UN Charter. The state practice for this possibility becoming customary law through
R2P is an evolution of humanitarian intervention, such as occurred in Kosovo. Force in this
manner must still be conducted as a last resort, with just cause, be proportionate to the harm
being done and have a reasonable chance of success. It must not be undertaken lightly and the
responsibility is still limited to what is required to bring an end to the wrongful act; this is
traceable to the past theory of just war.
In Part II the existing framework for the use of force is briefly discussed; in particular, the UN
Charter system which limits the circumstances in which states may lawfully resort to force,
and prima facie makes unlawful the use of force in the absence of either self-defence or an
UNSC resolution. Part III offers a brief explanation of just war theory and ties the traditional
rationales legitimising use of force to the modern framework, including both R2P and its precursor, humanitarian intervention. Part IV considers the role R2P played in two contemporary
uprisings: in Libya, 2011; and in Syria, 2012/2013. Finally Part V concludes that the current
use of force under the banner of R2P, is the best option to allow the prevention of future
atrocities, even if the principle is still evolving.

II

EXISTING LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR THE USE OF FORCE

In one sense, the law regarding use of force is relatively straight forward. The UN Charter
ensures all states are equally sovereign,7 with art 2(4) specifying a general prohibition against
using force to interfere in the territorial integrity and political independence of a state.8 This
basic rule precludes both the United Nations (‘UN’) and member states ‘interven[ing] in
matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction’ of the state in question.9 The
prohibition on the use of force is also a part of customary international law.10 This prohibition
is subject to two clear exceptions: firstly, the enforcement of international peace and security
as authorised by the UNSC; and secondly, the right of self-defence. The parameters and extent
of the exceptions remain less certain.

7

Charter of the United Nations art 2(1).
Ibid art 2(4).
9
Ibid art 2(7).
10
Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v United States of America)
(Judgement) [1986] ICJ Rep 14, 100.
8
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The UN mandate includes maintenance of international peace and security, and human rights
promotion. 11 The UN Charter gives the UNSC primary responsibility for maintaining
international peace and security.12 A range of methods short of force can be used to achieve
this,13 but ultimately, the UNSC can authorise the use of force where appropriate.14 Given that
all states upon becoming party to the UN Charter agree to settle their disputes peacefully,15
UNSC guided action should only come into effect where states are unable to resolve disputes
themselves.
The UNSC’s responsibility is to ‘maint[ain] … international peace and security’16 and it has
given ‘threats to international peace’ an ever-broadening definition. 17 Gross violations of
human rights, including genocide and crimes against humanity have been recognised as threats
to international peace and security, and as a consequence fall within the UNSC’s mandate.18
In determining whether to use force in response to these threats, the UNSC has no explicit
Charter limitations on when it may do so, aside from a general requirement to act in accordance
with the ‘Purposes and Principles of the United Nations’.19 Since the UNSC lacks its own
forces, it falls to member states to facilitate and implement UNSC action to maintain or restore
international peace and security.20 It is important to note that the UN Charter lacks set legal
obligations to protect and enforce human rights.
In addition to use of force authorised by the UNSC there is a second widely accepted exception
to the use of force prohibition. This is self-defence as authorised under art 51 of the UN
Charter. Derived from a pre-UN customary law right,21 self-defence in international law is
limited by the Caroline criteria of proportionality, necessity and immediacy;22 meaning, action
taken is confined to defence and not retribution. The question as to whether the UN Charter’s
right of self-defence replaces the customary right, or runs concurrently, is outside the ambit of
this article.23
Running parallel to the UN Charter restrictions are the rules of international humanitarian law
(‘IHL’). IHL requires that upon use of force being undertaken, states must abide by four core

11

Charter of the United Nations art 1.
Ibid art 24.
13
Ibid art 33, 39. These include facilitating peaceful dispute settlement between states and taking preventative or
enforcement action before use of force.
14
Ibid art 42.
15
Ibid art 2(3).
16
Ibid art 24(1).
17
Klinton Alexander, ‘NATO’s Intervention in Kosovo: The Legal Case for Violating Yugoslavia’s National
Sovereignty in the Absence of Security Council Approval’ (2000) 22 Houston Journal of International Law 403,
412.
18
See, eg, SC Res 1675, UN SCOR, 5430th mtg, UN Doc S/Res/1675 (28 April 2006).
19
Charter of the United Nations art 24(2).
20
Ibid art 2(5).
21
Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v United States of America)
(Judgement) [1986] ICJ Rep 14.
22
See Letter from Mr Webster, US Secretary of State to Lord Ashburton, 6 August 1842 <http://avalon.law
.yale.edu/19th_century/br-1842d.asp>.
23
Much of the debate has arisen in the context of discussing the lawfulness of anticipatory self-defence (ie, prior
to the existence of an armed attack, but with a view to preventing an imminent one). See, eg, Michael J Glennon,
‘Fog of Law: Self-Defense, Inherence, and Incoherence in Article 51 of the United Nations Charter’ (2001) 25(2)
Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy 539, 553-56.
12
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principles which will limit their available military action. 24 This is applicable whether or not
use of force occurs via self-defence or on another basis. The four IHL principles limit the
action taken to only that which is necessary to achieve the specific objective,25 designed only
to cause harm which is proportionate to the military objective,26 is not unnecessarily cruel or
inhumane27 and which at all times distinguishes between civilians and combatants.28 Like the
Caroline criteria, these guiding principles, particularly the first two, suggest war’s legality
cannot be determined by only looking at whether the initial reason is ‘valid’. For example, the
lawfulness of UNSC authorised military action could be undermined if the military objectives
were not of sufficient gravity to justify the injuries that a particular form of use of force would
inevitably produce.
Although it would be naïve to suggest regard for the UN system’s rules was solely responsible
for the lack of a ‘World War’ post-1945,29 it is clear that respect for the UNSC action and selfdefence as exceptions to use of force have been integral. If it is argued however, that the UN
Charter offers comprehensive coverage of the law regarding use of force, it raises the important
question of what recourse exists as an alternative where the UNSC fails to act in defence of
human rights abuses occurring within a state’s sovereign borders. Since the UNSC’s creation
it has never directly authorised use of force in order to prevent or stop genocide or crimes
against humanity. The atrocities which were allowed to occur in Rwanda and the former
Yugoslav Republics, resulted from the failure of non-forceful methods, combined with political
deadlocks and preference for state sovereignty, constraining the UNSC from adequately
fulfilling its mandate to protect international peace and security.30
A consequence of the UNSC failures in the 1990s was the renewed debate over the scope of
exceptions to the general prohibition on the use of force when the UNSC fails to act. First,
humanitarian intervention, and then R2P, arose as explanations for how states may legitimise
24

It is not the purpose of this article to provide an extensive review of IHL principles, nor to argue their customary
international law status. Extensive discussion and evidence of the customary status of the IHL rules can be found
in Jean-Marie Henckaerts and Louise Doswald-Beck, Customary International Humanitarian Law (International
Committee of the Red Cross, 2005). The sources in the following footnotes are indicative only.
25
See, eg, Charter of the International Military Tribunal at Nuremburg art 6; Geneva Convention (IV) relative to
the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, opened for signature 12 August 1949, 75 UNTS 287 (entered
into force 21 October 1950) arts 27, 54.
26
See, eg, Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of
Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), opened for signature 8 June 1977, 1125 UNTS 3 (entered
into force 7 December 1979), art 51(5)(b).
27
See, eg, Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May
be Deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects (and Protocols) (As Amended on 21
December 2001), opened for signature 10 October 1980, 1342 UNTS 137 (entered into force 2 December 1983),
preamble.
28
See, eg, Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of
Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), opened for signature 8 June 1977, 1125 UNTS 3 (entered
into force 7 December 1979), art 48.
29
The politics of ‘mutually assured destruction’ and non-legal considerations influencing the decisions of the
major powers, must be acknowledged as having a significant role in keeping the majority of conflicts as de facto
engagements between the major powers; rather than a direct US/USSR war. A concise discussion of many of
these factors can be found in David S Painter, Cold War: An Interdisciplinary History (Routledge, 1999).
30
For discussions of the various measures and developments which ultimately led to the failure of the UN to
prevent atrocities, see, eg, Alan J Kuperman, Limits of Humanitarian Intervention: Genocide in Rwanda
(Brookings, 2001), especially Chs 4, 7; Adam Roberts, ‘NATO's “Humanitarian War” over Kosovo’ (1999) 41(3)
Survival 102, 103-4; C Guicherd, ‘International Law and the War in Kosovo’ (1999) 41(2) Survival 19, 27.
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using force in defence of the world’s most helpless and victimised. The two approaches to use
of force outside of UNSC authorisation are inherently linked, but offer slightly different
rationales. Humanitarian intervention, as understood in the 1990s, has largely been replaced
by R2P when states seek to justify their use of force against those who commit atrocities.31
The remainder of this article examines how humanitarian intervention and R2P fit within the
tradition of just war, and how through this, R2P can be seen as having a legal basis in the
modern international system. The article also discusses the effect of a changed definition of
sovereignty, including its effect on statehood.

III THEORETICAL AND LEGAL JUSTIFICATIONS
A

Just War Theory

Just war theory predates the modern UN system, and also predates the Westphalian system of
states.32 Just wars’ influence continues to be seen within the modern international legal rules
governing the use of force. It is acknowledged that just war is not a monolithic tradition, as it
has appeared in various forms throughout history. 33 This article does not purport to be a
comprehensive study of just war, with this brief historical context seeking only to point to the
coherent core of just war theory, suggesting there are circumstances where it is legitimate for
states to use force, notwithstanding the plethora of other obligations states have acquired. The
question in modern times has shifted from legitimate to legal.34 Despite this shift, modern
international law’s prohibition on the use of force (and the limited exceptions) clearly find their
roots in just war theory.
Just war theory is based on the premise that there is no absolute right to wage war. Just war
requires that states resorting to use of force must only do so within certain constraints; both
with regard to the reasons for going to war and the manner in which that war is conducted.
Just war requires use of force by states to be justified against certain criteria. The authority
making the decision to use force35 needs to base it on just cause undertaken to advance a good

31

See, eg, Janzekovic, above n 6. See also Maogoto, above n 6, for a concise discussion of the
retaliation/anticipatory self-defence arguments put forward by the US in 2002/3.
32
For a concise explanation of the development of the principle of just war from antiquity to modern times, see,
eg, Joachim von Elbe, ‘The Evolution of the Concept of the Just War in International Law’ (1939) 33(4) American
Journal of International Law 665.
33
Ibid.
34
The concepts of legitimate and legal are not always clearly distinguishable. In this article, legal is used to refer
to those actions which comply with the formal legal rules of the international system. An action which is legitimate
is one which is morally and ethically defensible. In international law, actions viewed as ‘illegal but legitimate’
may result in widespread acceptance of the action and lack of enthusiasm for legal sanction for the technically
illegal act. For a good discussion of this admittedly controversial division, see Thomas M Franck, Recourse to
Force: State Action against Threats and Armed Attacks (Cambridge University Press, 2002) 174-91.
35
This will become significant when considering the lawfulness of R2P when it is not exercised by the United
Nations. For Augustine and succeeding theorists, authority was generally tied to the sovereign or government.
See, eg, John J Davenport, ‘Just War Theory, Humanitarian Intervention, and the Need for a Democratic
Federation’ (2011) 39(3) Journal of Religious Ethics 493, 512.
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intention.36 Further, the ‘just cause’ had to be one of ‘substantial importance’,37 suggesting the
choice to use military action in order to advance this good intention, must be of sufficient
weight that such an extreme response was necessary and proportionate to the cause. 38 Brown
has suggested this proportionality criteria is paramount in understanding and maintaining, the
legitimacy of any use of force.39 In applying this principle to World War I, Biggar explains
the rationale for needing proportionality in a more pragmatic manner; ‘if the violence used is
not proportionate to one's purported end, then there is prima facie reason to doubt what is
purported.’40
A good cause alone is therefore insufficient, if one is to accept Augustine’s starting point of
pacifist inclination.41 War, Augustine suggested, is only legitimate when a wrong has been
perpetrated by the opposing side, ‘a wrong so grievous that neither the wrongdoer nor their
victims would be well served by leniency.’42 Augustine also pointed to additional criteria to
be assessed in determining whether a war is just. Most notably the criteria includes the need
for war to be a ‘last resort’ and that there be a good ‘prospect of success’; ie, a fight which
cannot be won, cannot achieve the underlying good cause. 43 According to Steinhoff these
additional criteria are most helpfully considered as sub-conditions of the ‘just cause’ and
‘proportionate response’ criteria:
Whether a war is proportionate also depends on what other means are available and how likely they are
to achieve the positive results that the war is supposed to bring about. Thus, one can only determine
whether there is a just cause by considering these other criteria.44

Whether one views these additional criteria as distinct or subsidiary, it is clear the core
characteristics of Augustine’s just war theory are found as common threads through later
theorists, who sought to reconcile the prima facie wrongfulness of war, with the apparent
continued recourse to war in the face of real or perceived injustice. Francisco Suarez, for
example, writing a millennium after Augustine, explained:
[N]ot every cause [is] sufficient to justify war, but only those causes which are serious and commensurate
with the losses that the war would occasion. For it would be contrary to reason to inflict very grave harm
because of a slight injustice.45

The proportionality of the ‘war’ response will always be situation specific; dependent on the
seriousness of the offence, the availability of alternative mechanisms and the likelihood of a
swift and satisfactory conclusion to the conflict. Even the most serious of causes must only

36

For a discussion on the development of the concept of just cause and right intention see David D Corey and
Daryl J Charles, Just War Tradition: An Introduction (ISI Books, 2012) 1-22.
37
Jean Bethke Elshtain, ‘Just War and Humanitarian Intervention’ (2001) 17 American University International
Law Review 1, 7.
38
Uwe Steinhoff, ‘Just Cause and Right Intention’ (2014) 13(1) Journal of Military Ethics 32, 34-35.
39
Gary D Brown, ‘Proportionality and Just War’ (2003) 2(3) Journal of Military Ethics 171, 174.
40
Nigel Biggar, In Defence of War (Oxford University Press, 2013) Chs 2, 4.
41
Steinhoff, above n 38, 34-35; John Mark Mattox, St Augustine and the Theory of Just War (Continuum
International Publishing, 2006) 60-61.
42
Corey and Charles, above n 36, 58.
43
Ibid.
44
Steinhoff, above n 38, 33-6.
45
Francisco Suárez, Selections from Three Works of Francisco Suarez, vol 2 (Clarendon Press, 1944) 816.
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warrant resorting to war with due consideration to the impact and consequences of that action.
In modern parlance: ‘Don’t barge in and make a bad situation worse’.46
As international law and theory shifted towards what is now recognised as ‘modern’
international law, Hugo Grotius offered the most comprehensive analysis of how just war
remains relevant to the sovereign state system. This resulted from the basic principle of nonintervention being the basis of the Westphalian peace, as opposed to merely being a reflection
of it. While Grotius owes much to his predecessors,47 his De Jure Belli ac Pacis (The Law of
War and Peace) remains influential in understanding the appropriate scope of war. This can
be largely attributed to Grotius’ attempt to shift the discussion from a theological to a secular
basis, and from a moral to a legal framework.48
It should be noted that Grotius also emphasised the formalities of war, which was later linked
to the post-Westphalian European positivist’s focus on form over substance.49 Certainly the
trend in the years, even centuries, following from Grotius’ writings was dominated by an
emphasis on positivism. States were led by ‘Machiavellian princes…driven by “reason of
State”’, 50 and within this framework, sovereigns gave little or no consideration to wars’
‘justice’ or ‘morality’. 51 Grotius, however, did devote attention to causes which could
legitimately justify a formal warfare declaration, whilst warning that in the absence of
authoritative bodies to judge the legitimacy of the claim to justice, law could do little to in fact
stop illegitimate wars from being waged.52
Grotius identified exemplar circumstances of ‘just causes’ for armed conflict, with the first two
being self-defence and recovery of land. More interestingly for this article, however, are the
other ‘just causes’ which legitimise the use of force, including where a State has failed to meet
its international legal obligations, and punishment of wrongdoing within the law of nature;53
provided that the crimes in question were ‘heinous and manifest’.54 Grotius did not expressly
include wars of liberation, as subjected populations were not his concern. 55 Although,
46

Elshtain, above n 37, 8.
The extent of Grotius’ reliance (direct or indirect) on theorists such as Francisco Suarez, Franciscus de Vitoria
and Alberico Gentili (among others) is unclear – but has been addressed in later commentaries on his work. See,
eg, Renee Jeffery, Hugo Grotius in International Thought (Palgrave Macmillan, 2006) 27-8. (Jeffrey provides a
literature review of other scholars on this point).
48
Ibid 28; Michael Walzer, Arguing about War (Yale, 2004) 5; James Turner Johnson, Ethics and the Use of
Force: Just War in a Historical Perspective (Ashgate, 2011) 83-4.
49
Robert J Delahunty and John Yoo, ‘From Just War to False Peace’ (2012) 13(1) Chicago Journal of
International Law 1, 19; Robert J Delahunty and John Yoo, ‘Making War’ (2007) 93 Cornell Law Review 123,
142-43; Steven Forde, ‘Hugo Grotius on Ethics and War’ (1998) 92(3) The American Political Science Review
639, 645.
50
Walzer, above n 48, 5.
51
Delahunty and Yoo, ‘From Just War to False Peace’, above n 49, 25.
52
Ibid 18-19; G I A D Draper, ‘Grotius' Place in the Development of Legal Ideas about War’ in Hedley Bull,
Benedict Kingsbury and Adam Roberts (eds), Hugo Grotius and International Relations (Oxford University Press,
1992) 177, 201.
53
For a concise overview of Grotius’ causes see Jeffery, above n 47, 40; Christoph Stumph, ‘Hugo Grotius: Just
War Thinking Between Theology and International Law’ in Heinz-Gerhard Justenhoven and William A Barbieri
(eds), Arbeiten zur Kirchengeschichte, Volume 120: From Just War to Modern Peace Ethics (Walter de Gruyter,
2012) 197, 407-410; Draper, above n 52, 194-96.
54
Grotius, cited in Jeffery, above n 47, 48.
55
Simon Chesterman, Just War or Just Peace? Humanitarian Intervention and International War (Oxford, 2002)
15.
47
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interestingly, Grotius did allow for ‘private’ war to be conducted, for example by the Dutch
East India Company against those who would wrongfully deprive them of property.56 Even
though Grotius was wary of extending international law’s applicability to those fighting against
an unjust sovereign, he did concede international law would legitimise humanitarian wars. 57
Such wars would be limited to the most extreme cases. Where one sovereign had violated the
rights of his subjects it was ‘open to another sovereign to assert the rights of the oppressed
subjects and intervene on their behalf.’58
Theorists both prior to and post Grotius have emphasised the universal character of natural law,
and the fundamental rights of humankind which it protects.59 It then follows, if one recognises
the common humanity which forms the basis of the law of nature as the basis of the
international legal regime, a war which is conducted in defence of those subject to the most
heinous of atrocities, would be not only just in a moral sense,60 but legal justice would permit,
and perhaps demand it.61 Of course all are wary to emphasise that the offence must be one of
the most extreme sort to justify intervening in the affairs of a sovereign state.62 Even prior to
formalising the rules on use of force post-1945, reliance on ‘humanitarian intervention’ to
legitimise military action was rare, and reserved to the most shocking of atrocities.63
B

Just War Theory and the Modern Rules

If one accepts that the two core elements of just war theory are just cause, including but not
limited to the rescue of people abused by their sovereign, and proportionality, including
likelihood of success, then the modern rules governing use of force can be explained as a
modernisation of the just war theory. The theorists discussed in the previous section were, as
Grotius acknowledged, operating within an international order where ‘informal’ mechanisms
were no more than political negotiations lacking formal mechanisms for dispute settlement.64
Consequently, the justifications for entry into war, can be seen as taking into account the
absence of viable alternatives for resolving conflicts and disputes. At the same time, the act of
warfare still imposes the proportionality requirement, suggesting that law would not legitimise
the use of force for any and all insults to the rights of a sovereign.65
Jeffery, above n 47, 37; Patrick A Messina and Craig J N de Paulo, ‘The Influence of Augustine on the
Development of Just War Theory’ in Craig J N de Paulo (ed), Augustinian Just War Theory and the Wars in
Afghanistan and Iraq: Confessions, Contentions, and the Lust for Power (Peter Lang Publishing, 2011) 23, 4648; Draper, above n 52, 204.
57
Chesterman, above n 55, 15.
58
Ibid.
59
Stumph, above n 53, 202-6.
60
Jeffery, above n 47, 42; Draper, above n 52, 204.
61
Jeffery, above n 47, 42; Draper, above n 52, 204.
62
Chesterman, above n 55, 15-16; Stumph, above n 53, 197, 211.
63
Garret provides an excellent overview of pre-20th century intervention highlighting how just war theory did
extend past ‘mere’ theory, albeit its application was tempered by the geo-political interests of the applicable state
powers. Recognised examples of action based largely on humanitarian concerns include: European powers’
intervention in Greece after the violent suppression of independence movements (1827); French led action
following the massacre of Maronite Christians in Ottoman Lebanon/Syria (1860); Russian intervention in the
Balkans following particularly violent atrocities by Turkish troops in Bulgaria (1870s); the US in response to
Spanish Concentration Camps in Cuba (1889). See Stephen A Garrett, Doing Good and Doing Well: An
Examination of Humanitarian Intervention (Greenwood Publishing, 1999) 10-14.
64
Delahunty and Yoo, ‘From Just War to False Peace’, above n 49, 18-19.
65
Jeffery, above n 47, 48.
56
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Modern international law provides alternatives not previously available to sovereign states
existing before the 20th century. There is also the requirement introduced from art 2(3) of the
UN Charter of a formal obligation to make use of the non-forceful dispute resolution
mechanisms. Further, while ‘right authority’ was only briefly acknowledged as part of just war
theory in the preceding section, this is because there was previously little or no debate about
where such authority lay. At most, there is some debate over whether ‘just war’ would entitle
a population to rise up against the oppressive sovereign, as opposed to the right of another
sovereign to intervene to protect the other sovereign’s population. 66 Notwithstanding this
debate, it is clear that, by and large, historic authority lay with the sovereign, and in the postWestphalian era this was more specifically the sovereign state.
The modern rules governing use of force add an interesting dimension to the application of just
war theory. This will be specifically discussed with regard to humanitarian intervention, but
in short the UNSC has been introduced as a clear authority beyond that of the sovereign state.
This is due to the wide acceptance of states to UN Charter terms granting power to the UNSC.
The more controversial question, is the extent that the UN Charter has led to the UNSC
effectively replacing the sovereign state as the ‘right authority’ for use of force within the
international system.
The UNSC clearly has significant power to authorise use of force within the scope of its
Chapter VII powers. It is equally clear that force has been exercised without UNSC
authorisation, and prior to the example of Kosovo, such action faced relatively little sanction.67
Krisch suggests that while the legal rules within the UN Charter have not changed since 1945,
‘[t]he relatively strong defence of the norm prohibiting intervention without [UNSC]
authorisation represents a significant shift in the parameters of the use of force since the Cold
War.’68 This is in part attributable to the political ideology stalemate that occurred during the
Cold War.
C

‘Humanitarian Intervention’

In one sense, the post-1945 approach to the use of armed force can be seen as a modern
adaptation of the ‘just war’ theory into a legal framework. By narrowing ‘just causes’ to selfdefence and the maintenance of international peace and security, whilst maintaining the
requirements of proportionality and necessity, just war could be said to be synonymous with
legal war. The pre-UN theorists however, were working in a situation in which the sovereign,
and later the sovereign state, was the only actor of any importance. Thus, while ‘right
authority’ warranted mere mention in the above section, it becomes a matter of importance
when considering whether force can be used for humanitarian purposes without UNSC
authority.
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Although there is no formal legal definition of humanitarian intervention69 Murphy has put
forward a helpful working definition. Humanitarian intervention is the threat or use of force
by a state, collective of states, or an international organization for the primary purpose of
protecting the target state’s nationals from widespread deprivations of internationally
recognised human rights.70 The contentious element of course is intervention outside of UN
authority. The doctrine of humanitarian intervention emerged from the impracticalities of
UNSC mandated action where decisions to take action ‘lack[ed] principled coherence’ 71 and
failed to prevent atrocities in places such as Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia. The UK
Foreign and Commonwealth Office in 1992 set out the criteria for circumstances where
humanitarian intervention could be legitimate. 72 The criteria includes: the situation is
compelling and urgent; the state in which the atrocities have occurred is unwilling or unable to
act; there is no alternative to external intervention; and intervention is proportional and
necessary.73 These criteria – presented as representing an exceptional but legal standard74 bear stark similarity to the elements of just war. In the absence of clear state practice in this
area, the arguments supporting humanitarian-based action appear to derive from the historic
just war obligation to protect populations from catastrophes.75 The question remains whether
the modern development of the UNSC has provided a finite answer with regard to ‘authority’.
The humanitarian intervention criteria are similar to the common understanding of R2P’s third
‘pillar’ discussed below.
Much of the debate about humanitarian intervention arose after its use in response to the
Kosovo crisis in the late 1990s. Following the breakup of the Socialist Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia (‘SFRY’) Kosovo was retained as an autonomous province of Serbia (at the time
part of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, the successor to the SFRY). 76 Conflict arose
between the local, ethnically Albanian population and the Serbian regime which, by 1997 had
implemented a policy of repression and utilised force against both the Kosovar ‘freedom
fighter/terrorist’77 movement seeking autonomy, and the local civilian population.78
In 1998 there was a UNSC resolution, labelling what was occurring in Kosovo a humanitarian
catastrophe, and an ongoing threat to international peace and security, but without authorising
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express actions to control the situation. 79 The resolution led to certain NATO members
intervening on humanitarian grounds,80 bombing areas of Kosovo in an effort to prevent any
further influx of soldiers harming ethnic Albanians in the area.81 The UNSC was unsuccessful
in passing a resolution declaring NATO’s action, which constituted use of force, as illegal,82
but did further authorise states to intervene to try and create peace.83
Particular concern was expressed regarding the Kosovo intervention and several states warned
that the humanitarian necessity of the Kosovo intervention ought not to imply the establishment
of a legal precedent – placing the action as a necessary but exceptional circumstance.84 Other
states however, justified the humanitarian intervention as compatible with the principles and
purposes of the UN when exercised solely for the prevention of human rights abuses.85 Adding
to this, Sir Hersch Lauterpacht had previously postulated a right of armed humanitarian
intervention, where ‘a State renders itself guilty of cruelties … in such a way as to deny [its
nationals] their fundamental human rights and to shock the conscience of mankind’. 86 In
accordance with the ICJ Statute for determining sources of international law, teachings of the
most highly qualified publicists are relevant in identifying and understanding international
law,87 and in regards to this article, key to establishing how R2P use of force may be legitimate.
The UN Charter describes the UNSC as having the ‘primary’ responsibility to act in the
interests of international peace and security. 88 As mentioned previously, art 39 of the UN
Charter, gives the UNSC the power to determine what international threats are. The
International Court of Justice (‘ICJ’) has also found that art 24 which confers primary
responsibility on the UNSC, does not confine all actions for maintaining international peace
and security to the UNSC’s ‘primary’ responsibility. 89 The article’s power is primary as
opposed to exclusive; however, only the UNSC can legally require states to use force against
another state.90
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It has been acknowledged by the ICJ that the UN Charter never intended to embody every
essential principle of international law 91 and the discussion above suggests there is the
argument (albeit contested) that armed intervention was permissible in circumstances of UNSC
identified atrocities; due to the UNSC only having a ‘primary’, not ‘sole’ role. In this context,
humanitarian use of force becomes more grounded through being based on sovereign
responsibility, or more particularly, on the failure of the sovereign to meet its responsibilities
both to the population in preventing atrocities, and the international community, upon threats
to international peace and security.
In 1999, commenting on the legality of the Kosovo intervention, Cassese suggested that it
would be ‘judicious to await any repetition of such actions under the same conditions and
exigencies’ before concluding whether humanitarian intervention had developed into a new
exception to the general prohibition on the (non-UNSC authorised) use of force.92 The state
practice necessary for identifying a customary rule in this area remains unclear and 15 years
after Kosovo the situation remains much discussed, but has not yet been ‘settled’. While the
opinio juris clearly points to a limited allowance for use of force when a state has exceeded its
scope of ‘sovereignty’ by abusing its population, the matter of ‘without UNSC authorisation’
is largely untested.
Notwithstanding the argument that gross violations of fundamental rights will undermine a
state’s claim to sovereignty, interpretation of art 2(4) can change over time as the world
develops, and if only UNSC identified threats, combined with a deadlocked Council, were
acted on, then the UN Charter would not be undermined via R2P use of force extended from
humanitarian intervention. Legitimate action would still be constrained by the just war
principles of necessity and proportionality (as the exercise of self-defence is similarly
constrained, despite the lack of express criteria within the UN Charter itself, as discussed
above). This utilises a permissive interpretation of the UN Charter and is consistent with the
language used in art 2(4), as no direct threat is made to a state’s sustained territory or political
independence.93 For those who insist on a restrictive interpretation in line with the travaux
préparatoires, which sought to completely constrain force except where clearly allowed by the
UN Charter, then the argument below of evolved sovereignty still ensures R2P has a future.94
Additionally, departure from a restrictive interpretation of the UN Charter is further supported
if the ‘secondary’ responsibility is acted upon only in the case of a UNSC deadlock.95 Such
action is arguably still consistent with the purposes of the UN Charter, in particular when
giving consideration to the preamble which affirms human rights and preventing war for future
generations.96 In addition to the UNSC only being given ‘primary’ responsibility, this adds
further to the interpretative basis for justifying a departure from restrictive interpretation,
coupled with global developments.
D
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The mass killings in Srebrenica and Rwanda occurred under the watch of the UN, highlighting
the collective inadequacies in international institutions.97 This criticism also came from within
the UN itself, particularly by the then Secretary-General Kofi Annan.98 Consequently, a 2001
Commission, the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (‘ICISS’)
set up by Canada, developed R2P 99 to improve the flaws in traditional UNSC action and
Humanitarian Intervention. 100 In querying how intervention can occur without violating State
sovereignty, the ICISS concluded that sovereignty included a responsibility to protect.101 The
ICISS alluded to just war’s ‘just cause’ threshold when it identified a test of serious and
irreparable harm being imminent or occurring, and that the force must be the last course of
action.102 A UN special report adopted this idea of R2P, reinforcing that modern sovereignty
now includes obligations to protect the people’s welfare, and that UN collective security means
the international community shares responsibility in ensuring this; as opposed to a
humanitarian intervention ‘right’ to intervene.103
A 2005 World Summit outcome, was R2P’s clear and unanimous acceptance by UN members
through a General Assembly resolution. 104 Drawing on the ICISS report, the UN further
clarified the ‘just cause’ test by limiting R2P to four crimes – genocide, war crimes, ethnic
cleansing and crimes against humanity,105 as opposed to the ICISS’ more general threshold
test.106 The United Nations General Assembly (‘UNGA’) accepted responsibility to assist in
accordance with UN Charter provisions, such as through the UNSC. 107 The challenge of
understanding R2P in the contemporary context is that, despite the unanimous acceptance that
all states via the UNSC and UNGA have a responsibility to act,108 the resolution was silent on
what to do should the UNSC fail to meet that responsibility.109
In early 2009, a UN Secretary-General report transformed R2P’s discourse into the
aforementioned three ‘pillars’ of R2P. For the first pillar, protection, the responsibility falls
primarily upon the state. The second, international assistance, should occur upon state failure.
The third, international intervention, must be timely and decisive, with peaceful means utilised
initially.110 In late 2009 an UNGA resolution acknowledged the importance of this report in
97
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developing R2P, even though it did not expressly accept the finer details in the report.111 The
UNGA did however state their continued consideration for R2P, recalling the 2005 resolution.
The 2009 report emphasised that the UN R2P use of force, pursuant to the 2005 Summit
outcome, should be channelled through the UNSC.112
Essentially, R2P is the term given to viewing sovereignty as including the responsibility each
state has to protect its population from mass atrocities. Deng suggested that failure to realise
this responsibility, including a failure to seek and accept assistance, places on the international
community an obligation to ‘find a way of intervening to provide the needed assistance’;113 as
opposed to intervening upon a right. UNGA resolutions are not binding, but given the original
2005 UNGA unanimous support and UNSC resolutions having regularly referenced R2P,114
discourse places R2P into the category of an ‘emerging norm’ of international law; without,
however, the level of certainty sufficient to comfortably represent a clear exception to the
general prohibition. Member state responses to the 2009 report show political division on
R2P’s scope and implementation.115 Subsequent analysis will show that only R2P’s first pillar
has reached customary law status, with the others still developing.
The mentioned elements of when humanitarian intervention can occur, are in essence the same
as R2P’s three pillars (in particular the third pillar); with criticism capable of being directed at
R2P for its similarities, depending on one’s perspective. R2P adds an obligation on the
international community to provide peaceful assistance, otherwise not present in the previously
existing humanitarian intervention doctrine.116 As mentioned above, this article will only focus
on use of force under R2P, although it is in essence the same as humanitarian intervention. The
subtle distinctions however enable R2P to improve on humanitarian intervention in theory,
even if presently lacking state practice on this new argument. R2P essentially acknowledges a
legal test for humanitarian intervention,117 with the shift to sovereign responsibility allowing
the intervention, instead of blocking it.
E

The Integrity of Sovereignty as an Alternative Justification for R2P

As stated, R2P has been recognised and conceptualised outside of the UNGA resolution as part
of modern sovereignty, with the international community having a secondary responsibility to
assist.118 If states have a globally agreed duty to protect their citizens from heinous crimes, to
the extent the duty becomes an element of statehood, then a breach would result in a loss of
111
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sovereignty. Redefining sovereignty allows broad R2P use of force to occur, as this avoids any
conflict with the UN Charter relating to state domestic affairs, territorial integrity and political
independence. Despite lacking state practice and clear opinio juris, states can pursue this
argument legally.
International sovereignty is not law-based but a source of law itself.119 Also, sovereignty is not
a matter of degree, but a result. 120 Since the UN’s formation, the world has continued to
develop, with international standards and benchmarks needing to be subject to new
interpretations and reforms,121 where there are no viable alternatives for resolving conflicts.
State practice is relevant to treaty interpretation, which includes the UN Charter.122
Sovereignty is an essential structural part of the modern state system.123 If interpretation of
sovereignty has changed, then sovereignty is not as inviolate as it was in the Westphalian
system.124 The UNSC resolutions referenced above mentioning this state responsibility, can
be used to evidence this. Crawford has explained ‘statehood’ as a form of standing within the
international legal system.125 States are presumed to have various rights and responsibilities
as opposed to statehood creating or proving such rights.126 In international law there is no
general entitlement to sovereignty; 127 recognition is not a condition for statehood in
international law, as an entity is recognised because it is a state.128 International sovereignty
requires recognition from other states to participate in the international community. 129 If
enough states view sovereignty as failed, due to an element of statehood failing, the ‘state’ is
no longer able to rely on sovereignty as the basis of its territorial independence; thus the R2P
use of force would not contravene the art 2(4) prohibition.
Countries such as China, Pakistan and Sudan have opposed the implementation of R2P, using
the concept of sovereignty to criticise it.130 Despite this, it is clear the modern international
system in which R2P’s critics (and supporters) are operating under, no longer supports a
concept of sovereignty which implies absolute power, as was proposed by 16th century
theorists.131 The modern concept of sovereignty is capable of complementing intervention.132
Regional bodies such as the African Union, have recognised that whilst there is the principle
119
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of non-interference and prohibition on use of force, there is also a right to intervene for grave
human rights matters.133 This recognition was triggered by the same humanitarian disasters as
the R2P principles’ formulation, 134 acknowledging that not taking action on human rights
matters solely on the principle of non-intervention, is flawed.135 Whilst this does not use the
new wording of ‘responsibility’ it is evidence of state practice to make the intention acceptable,
and that not taking action on human rights matters solely on the principle of non-intervention
is flawed.136
R2P indicates that when a state is unwilling or unable to exercise its responsibility as the
principal caretaker of its citizens, it loses its right to this primacy and therefore sovereignty.137
Sovereignty’s new formulation is rooted in the reality of today’s global interdependence.138
This creates a different type of sovereignty than the one which was a barrier to intervention
during the 19th and 20th centuries.139 While states have yet to clearly utilise this argument,
given the nature of sovereignty’s definition, and that acts which are viewed as ‘violations’ can
still be used as the basis for becoming an international norm,140 it is an important R2P legal
argument to note.
This present conceptualisation of sovereignty is not dissimilar to the just war theory postulated
by Grotius, focusing on preventing the wrongdoing of heinous and manifest crimes, and the
enforcement of unfulfilled obligations, being legitimate ‘just causes’ for use of force. This
view of legitimisation of action provides a basis for use of force via R2P, conceptualised
outside of the UNGA resolution, by tying sovereignty to the obligation to protect one’s people
from harm where the subjected population faces serious circumstances. This conception of
sovereignty also improves upon the theory of just war as formulated in the past, due to the
judicial international institutions now in operation. Both the ICJ and the International Criminal
Court (‘ICC’) exist to examine questions of legitimacy for any just force taken under R2P;
albeit the ICJ ultimately lacked jurisdiction when the pre-R2P NATO action was challenged141
and the ICC’s jurisdiction for crimes of aggression is not yet in force. The proportionality and
necessity criteria to intervene under this modern sovereignty is explored more fully in the next
section, where state-specific situations are analysed.
Overall, sovereignty can only be justified as long as the basic right to life is preserved.142
Arguably, R2P does not breach sovereignty and the UN Charter, as force is used to protect
‘sovereignty’ from consistent violations of the ruling authority. 143 Observing sovereignty
133
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philosophically, it is possible to draw the conclusion that sovereigns cannot go against the basic
objective of their power, which is to protect the life of people, as a type of social contract. 144
Even philosophers such as Locke and Rousseau, who viewed the state as having unlimited
power, tempered this to the extent it is legitimately exercised.145 R2P ‘sovereignty’ has old
roots, with states needing to respect the rights of their citizens to ensure non-intervention, as
articulated by academics in the early 1900s.146 While it may lead to the UNSC being less
willing to call something a threat to peace and security, the threshold to intervene under R2P
is arguably high as demonstrated in the discussion on Libya and Syria below.147

IV

PRACTICAL IMPLEMENTATION

The structure of the UNSC has allowed and resulted in its actions (or inactions) to be politically
motivated.148 One permanent UNSC member vetoing a substantive matter resolution makes
the resolution ineffective. Often used during the Cold War along political lines,149 the veto
prevented sanctioned action on humanitarian issues;150 this remains true in the present day.151
While a version of R2P received collective global acceptance in 2005, it has failed to be put
into effective implementation.152
The following analysis of the uprisings in Libya and Syria demonstrates how UN-authorised
‘R2P’ has had limited use and why it is unlikely to be exercised again soon.153 The UNGA
version of R2P, unlike the ICISS’, does not include an agreement that the UNSC five
permanent members will not veto humanitarian issues, nor does it include specific approval of
UNGA or regional organisations taking direct action if the UNSC fails to take action. 154
Arguably to cover the whole R2P concept the UN needs to take further steps,155 expanding
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their ‘watered down’ version. 156 This is needed, as without an effective, agreed, noncontentious way to manage and intervene when genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity
and ethnic cleansing occur, further atrocities will continue to be committed, undermining the
ability of R2P to fulfil its purposes.
A

The Libyan Civil War

1 The Situation
In what was termed the ‘Arab Spring’, autocratic regimes were overthrown throughout the
Middle East and northern Africa by civilian uprisings starting from 2010.157 This occurred in
a bid to overthrow political suppression and fulfil socio-economic demands. 158 In midFebruary 2011 protests started in Libya, and by March the rebellion was a full scale armed
conflict.159 Those involved in the uprising clashed with the military forces of Libya’s then de
facto leader, Colonel Muammar Gaddafi,160 already known for his oppressive regime.161
Libya’s situation devolved rapidly.162 Gaddafi’s use of force against the uprising far exceeded
the suppression of contemporaneous protests in other states, with indiscriminate shelling of
urban centres occurring early on.163 Within a month the Human Rights Council (‘HRC’) set
up an International Commission of Inquiry into the situation.164 It recommended that UNGA
suspend Libya’s HRC membership.165 The Arab League suspended Libya’s membership to
their own organisation.166 These actions were based on grave concern over the increasingly
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violent treatment of the Libyan people, with mass killings, arbitrary arrests and torture being
reported.167
UNSC Resolution 1970 passed on 26 February 2011168 acknowledged the HRC and regional
organisation’s condemnation.169 It demanded that the violence end and the legitimate demands
of the population be fulfilled. 170 The UNSC viewed the violence as one of international
concern and sought to bring an end to the violence by instituting an arms embargo,171 travel
ban,172 asset freeze, 173 and for the matter to be referred to the ICC. 174 The resolution was
passed unanimously.175 The resolution’s IHL reference confirmed the rebellion had progressed
to an armed conflict. 176 In referring the situation to the ICC, the UNSC demonstrated a
willingness to convey that crimes against humanity were possibly being committed by an acting
state leader.177
By this point in time the forces opposing Gaddafi had organised into the National Transitional
Council (‘NTC’).178 In March the UNGA suspended Libya’s HRC membership,179 and the
ICC opened their investigation. 180 The African Court of Human and People’s Rights
condemned the situation, making provisional measures that fighting should cease. 181 With
Gaddafi’s call for extermination of the opposition,182 the League of Arab States and the African
Union condemned the violations of human rights and IHL in Libya, 183 as did Libyan rebel
leaders.184 With non-military measures failing to protect Libyans, the Arab League called for
a no fly zone to be implemented on 12 March.185 On 17 March the UNSC passed Resolution
1973, 186 implementing a no fly zone, 187 and authorising member states and regional
organisations to take ‘all necessary measures’ to protect civilians and civilian populated areas
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from attack by Libyan State troops, upon notifying the UN Secretary-General; with the
exclusion of placing foreign occupation forces in Libyan territory.188
Within two days of Resolution 1973, NATO began bombing Libyan Government positions
from which attacks upon civilians were imminent;189 NATO activities in Libya throughout the
ongoing months, were known as operation ‘Unified Protector’. 190 NATO, acting with
Morocco, Jordan, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates,191 remained in close contact with the
UN and other regional organisations during its intervention.192 At its commencement, action
mainly consisted of air attacks on tanks, artillery and units in front line combat.193 In the next
two months wider attacks on command and control centres were required to prevent
government attacks on Libyan people.194 In the course of these events, UNSC Resolution 2009
established the United Nations Support Mission in Libya (‘UNSMIL’) under the leadership of
a special representative to the Secretary-General to help restore order, rule of law, political
dialogue and public services; 195 in addition to starting to lift the arms embargo and asset
freezes.196 It also recognised the NTC as the official representative of Libya.197 By October
the ousted Gaddafi had been killed as a result of the fighting. 198 The UNSC made 31 October
the expiry date for Resolution 1973’s no-fly zone and state permission to protect civilians by
any means necessary.199
While the ‘forceful’ intervention was relatively limited in time, the UNSC remained concerned
about Libya’s situation, receiving regular updates as the 2012 interim government and
subsequent Tobruk Government sought to re-establish a functioning society.200 In 2012 the
UNSC expressed concern about reprisals and called on the Libyan authorities to take steps to
prevent this, stressing that they had the primary responsibility to ensure this.201 The UNSMIL,
whose mandate had been continually renewed to try to help the situation,202 had repeatedly
expressed concerns about the instability caused by resurgent conflict. 203 The increased
188
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intensity in fighting in 2014 had dire effects on civilians 204 and worsened the political
situation. 205 In 2014 when UNSMIL had to remove all personnel, 206 there was repeated
targeting of foreign representatives, especially in the Benghazi area.207
In the lead up to the 2014 violence there was ongoing, widespread abuse, attributed to the
militias and armed groups throughout the State, which in the preceding three years had failed
to be held to account.208 There were reports of abductions, torture and killings taking place,
without State protection being provided; 209 these occurred mainly on the basis of political
perspectives and backgrounds. 210 Indiscriminate bombings (as under Gaddafi) was also
occurring.211 The UNSC’s approach in late 2014 had been to deplore the violence, calling for
an immediate ceasefire, and encouraging the African Union and Arab League to try and
construct a political dialogue.212 The UNSC aimed to use sanctions to create stability,213 by reenforcing previous travel and asset bans on certain Libyan people and assets, in addition to
arms restrictions.214 While the level of violence fell short of necessitating (as yet) further use
of force authorisation, the UNSC has remained engaged with the situation and is bringing nonforceful pressure to bear on the Tobruk Government 215 (in its attempt to realise its
responsibility for the whole of the Libyan population).
2 Requisite Seriousness
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While the UNSC did not expressly rely on R2P to legitimise its authorisation of force in Libya,
this situation has been called a ‘textbook illustration’ justifying R2P.216 An examination of the
reasons for the intervention suggest just war’s criteria influenced both the decision to intervene
and the widespread acceptance of the legitimacy of the UNSC’s decision. The crimes and
atrocities that occurred are not detailed in full below, but are evidenced through the conclusions
provided by international assessments,217 which give way to the following discussion of R2P’s
authority to intervene.
In Resolutions 1970 and 1973 the UNSC recognised Libya’s situation as a continuing threat to
international peace and security. 218 The ICC referral also demonstrated how serious the
situation appeared. Whilst the UNSC had power to authorise force immediately, it clearly
sought non-forceful resolution measures prior to Resolution 1973. It was only once Gaddafi
concretely demonstrated that he had no intention of abating his attacks, that the UNSC viewed
forceful intervention as a legitimate course of action. 219 As Gaddafi’s words and actions
escalated, calls to hunt down and execute protestors, ‘door to door’, ‘house to house’ and the
labelling of opponents as ‘cockroaches’, reminiscent of the Rwandan genocide, convinced the
global community that the threat was serious enough to warrant action.220
After force was authorised, the serious threat faced by the Libyan population became
increasingly evident, allowing the continued involvement of international troops. In
Resolution 1973 the UNSC acknowledged that the actions of troops under Gaddafi, consisting
of widespread and systematic attacks, may have amounted to crimes against humanity.221 The
ICC Prosecutor reported in May 2011 that based on available information there were
reasonable grounds to believe crimes against humanity and war crimes had been committed,
and were continuing despite the UN-authorised force.222 The ICC later issued warrants for the
arrest of Gaddafi and others during the fighting.223 The ICC Prosecutor’s view was echoed by
the Commission of Inquiry report in June 2011 which reported violations by the Gaddafi
regime.224
Post-Gaddafi’s fall, the International Commission of Inquiry in 2012 independently found
through retrospective analysis that wide ranging human rights violations did systemically occur
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under Gaddafi forces in 2011.225 The Commission also independently found that abuses were
still rampant in 2012, with the distinction that they were no longer part of a system of brutality
directed by the central government.226 The conditions, with 2014 resurgent fighting in Libya,
have not improved, with inhumane treatment of those in custody or in proximity to the
fighting.227
3 Authority to Intervene
A wide range of mechanisms were employed in responding to Libya in 2011, before the
ultimate use of force.228 Peaceful methods had failed with Gaddafi and led to Libya openly
refusing to cooperate with calls from the international community to cease violence and respect
human rights and international law.229 The eventual use of force resulted in Libya challenging
the traditional notion of sovereignty.230 This part of the article seeks to analyse R2P’s role in
UNSC Resolution 1973, and what R2P action was justified outside the scope of the UNGA
version.
In the case of Libya, UNSC action was taken. The basis for that action remains contested. Some
have stated that R2P’s role has been over exaggerated in regards to what occurred in Libya.231
Whether or not the UNSC was using its general authority,232 R2P was a consideration, even if
not exclusive. 233 The resolution’s preamble referenced R2P, but not in the substantive
section.234 It confirmed the Libyan government’s responsibility to protect Libyan citizens.235
Demonstrating R2P’s first pillar is part of state practice, and considering its implementation,
also opinio juris forming customary law. The resolution was silent as to states acting on R2P’s
later pillars.236
Whilst China and Russia did not veto the Libyan resolution there was political tension, with
abstentions from the resolution.237 They cited the Arab League’s support for the resolution as
225
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integral to them adopting this position.238 In the context of understanding ‘right authority’, the
consideration of other sources for support is interesting. It is absurd to suggest that China and
Russia were looking to the Arab League for ‘authority’ to approve the use of force, but the
consideration of regional organisations being better placed to understand the necessities of the
crisis does suggest that there is a division between legitimacy and legality.
Non-veto powers such as Germany, Brazil and India also abstained from the Libyan resolution,
for reasons including interpretation.239 This leads to the conclusion states were hesitant in how
R2P was implemented, but accepted the importance of doing something to protect another
state’s civilians.240 This explains the absence of R2P third pillar language in the resolution
which utilised any means necessary to protect civilians. However, it is worth noting, the no fly
zone use of force part of the resolution, in receiving support from the populace themselves, as
well as the wider Arab world,241 showed a global support for R2P and a change in regional
dynamics. 242 This occurred despite a ‘culture’ of interference not being accepted
historically. 243 This resulted in the first UN mandated military intervention against a
‘sovereign’ state against the will of the state’s leader.244
The NATO-led intervention never reached the stage of ‘boots on the ground’,245 but use of
force was not outside the scope of the resolution as long as it served the purpose of protecting
civilians. This could be argued as R2P’s third pillar;246 even if not the UNSC’s explicit intent,
the authorised use of force was clearly informed by just war principles, and in the modern
context suggested that the UNSC was implementing the third R2P pillar. A consideration is
whether, pursuant to the first argument relating to R2P postulated above, UNSC
acknowledgment could have allowed R2P intervention more broadly, as existing outside of the
UNGA version. This consideration, outlined below, is followed by whether sovereignty had
also failed therefore still allowing intervention.
It is important to note, that regardless of one’s opinion on whether NATO’s action was within
the scope of the resolution, or a broader part of R2P, NATO was still constrained by
proportionality and necessity. At the time initial action was taken, NATO’s response raised
questions of proportionality and timeliness,247 with some members of the global community
feeling the resolution generally went beyond what was acceptable. 248 The harshest criticism
accused NATO’s military campaign of desiring regime change, since, in practice, it allowed
the Libyan opposition advantageous conditions to capture Gaddafi.249
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The issue with disputing the legitimacy of force taken under the resolution, is whether the
wording ‘under threat of attack’ in paragraph four of the resolution, allowed the resolution to
be interpreted overall as defending civilian populated areas not under ‘imminent’ attack. This,
in combination with ‘all necessary measures’, was quite broad. 250 Additionally, stating
‘civilian populated areas’ created a natural tendency for the intervention to favour one side of
the conflict in terms of the use of force direction.251 Whilst one could go into the minutia of
the distinction between civilians and the insurgent rebel combatants,252 and when NATO armed
the rebels compared to when the arms embargo eased, there was no paucity of information of
what Gaddafi had previously directed towards those who confronted him. Given that the
information on crimes against humanity and war crimes occurring under Gaddafi surfaced
when NATO expanded their action, coupled with the call for more to be done by those opposing
Gaddafi, arguably there was a necessity for NATO’s expanded actions, as proportional to the
threat of Gaddafi if he re-gained territory during the fight. 253 NATO therefore remained
focused on halting civilian suffering.254
R2P occurred in the use of force taken in Libya, and the following seeks to highlight that even
if this was outside the scope of the resolution, it was still justifiable under R2P. The UNSC in
their primary responsibility to act, found that Libya’s situation was a continuing threat to
international peace and security.255 As previously detailed, the art 2(4) exception, under art 24,
is not exclusive in nature. This allowed NATO’s action to fall under a secondary responsibility
given the status the UNSC provided Libya, if the resolution’s scope was overstepped. This
permissive interpretation means the UN Charter was not undermined, in bringing about the
resolution of atrocities occurring in the situation.
NATO’s wide interpretation concerning operation Unified Protector has clearly caused tension
with sovereignty’s traditional conception,256 with long lasting political consequences of what
has been called the widest possible interpretation of Resolution 1973.257 This leads to the more
polemical argument that NATO’s actions were warranted under R2P regardless of a resolution.
The regime change allegations directed at NATO became more prominent when further force
was used to ‘protect future generations from tyranny’.258 However, pursuant to the argument
outlined earlier, sovereignty is not absolute in nature; a state requires the ability to perform the
basic functions associated with statehood, 259 with R2P thus not breaching sovereignty but
enhancing it. 260 The regime change accusations are less convincing if the basic duty of a
sovereign to guarantee for the population ‘a system of law and order that is responsive to the
national population’s needs for justice and general welfare’, is recalled.261 Regime change,
although not the core of a R2P/just war intervention, is not an unpredictable outcome and
250
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makes such intervention controversial.262 Regime change ought not to be attributed to the use
of force per se, but instead is a reflection of the extreme failure (indeed the refusal) of the
Gaddafi regime to meet the basic obligations of sovereignty, as evidenced by the presence of
atrocities. This meant that there was no political integrity to violate and it was also not at odds
with the UN Charter.
Objections to ‘humanitarian intervention’ type action often have a political grounding,263 with
traditional state sovereignty being valued by weaker powers. 264 The Libyan situation
demonstrated recognition of limited, rather than absolute sovereignty. The international
intrusion retained the just war requirement of proportionality by paralleling the failure of the
Libyan regime and constraining the extent of force to the minimum required to allow Libya to
re-assert its (atrocity-free) sovereignty. Human Rights Watch and the International
Commission of Inquiry in Libya have both acknowledged that NATO followed IHL, 265
carrying out actions to avoid civilian casualties.266 Whilst this has not helped to lessen the view
of certain states being resistant to implementing R2P on the misconception it interferes with
sovereignty, 267 NATO’s action has added to state practice for intervention when the
responsibility to react calls for it.
The above discussion provides an appropriate analysis of R2P in 2011 Libya. However, as
mentioned Libya’s current situation is far from a state of peace, with accountability and human
rights acknowledgment. Whilst the UNSC has in its acknowledgement of the continually
deteriorating situation in Libya, made the point to reaffirm Libya’s independence and territorial
integrity,268 whether R2P becomes applicable to present day Libya, is dependent on whether
peaceful means have been exhausted in necessitating a use of force. Similarly, the state would
appear to have demonstrated a complete lack of willingness to attempt to protect its people and
reform the situation. The exhaustion of these aspects has not yet occurred to the same extent
of failure as seen in the past; thus it does not yet authorise a repeat of R2P intervention. The
current divide in Libya may reach the requisite level of seriousness, but to date, there is a
distinction between violent clashes in Libya, compared to Gaddafi’s call for extermination in
Benghazi.
R2P adds a layer of political and moral commitment to principles already existing in
international law.269 R2P sceptics and decision makers motivated by self-interest politics have
tried using the narrow R2P role the UNSC debatably allowed in Libya to de-legitimise the
concept.270 Regardless of the UNSC perspective, R2P was warranted in Libya and in its legacy
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one cannot expect ‘change to occur overnight’. There is no doubt that disagreement over the
Libyan resolution’s scope has significantly attributed to the inability to reach consensus on
civilian protection issues in Syria,271 upon the civil unrest starting with the ‘Syrian Uprising’.
R2P is the most comprehensive effort so far to deal with the worst crimes humanity is capable
of. It should be acknowledged that development of norms is not always a linear process272 and
that despite the following discussion, R2P still has potential.
B

The Syrian Uprising

1 The Situation
In 2011 coinciding with the ‘Arab Spring’, there was the start of civil unrest in Syria.273 The
Assad Government initially sought to limit the protests, but by mid-April 2011 the crisis was
evident.274 The attempt to silence protestors via military force failed to bring an end to the civil
unrest, as the protests spread throughout the country.275 Further, it was suspected extremist
elements were seeking to inflame tensions, ‘mingling with the demonstrators and using the
demonstrations to attack security personnel and damage Government property.’ 276 Unable to
distinguish between extremists and civilians (and arguably making little effort to do so),
Assad’s forces appeared to have responded with an increased use of force against the protestors
en masse, even when there was no apparent threat.277
The Human Rights Council’s Commission of Enquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic concluded
there was strong evidence of human rights and humanitarian violations including, but not
limited to, arbitrary military attacks against un-armed civilians, raids on hospitals and mosques,
deprivation of basic utilities (in particular water and communications) and the blocking of
access to medical assistance.278 The UNSC, whilst clearly having the first responsibility to
respond to the crisis at an international level, had trouble moving past discussion on the matter.
Whilst all members expressed their ‘concern’279 about the crisis, it was clear they differed on
what ‘responsibility’ the UN, on behalf of the international community, had to act.280 This
stalemate on the appropriate scope of international response undermined diplomatic efforts to
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negotiate a peaceful outcome. Persistent use of the veto281 meant that it was not until 2014 that
a resolution was passed that specifically responded to the humanitarian crisis and called for
accountability.282
2 Requisite Seriousness
The experience of the humanitarian crisis in Syria raises important questions about the level of
seriousness required to trigger the responsibility to protect. The Syrian crisis demonstrates that
a long, protracted conflict in which crimes against humanity are likely to be occurring raises
R2P, but only at the level of the first pillar (that of state responsibility). It is clear neither state
practice nor opinio juris exists to legitimise military intervention unless a significant event,
development or escalation occurs and, is likely to continue, pushing the situation from a mere
crisis to something much more.
One must also recall that military intervention is only legitimate under R2P where non-military
options have failed, or are unlikely to be successful. The challenge posed by Syria is that the
success (or lack) of the peaceful means for resolving the humanitarian crisis can be tied to the
lack of international support behind those peaceful means. The implication being that in the
absence of a willingness to resort to force when peaceful measures fail, those responsible for
the crisis lack motivation to change their behaviour.
Two periods of time can be compared to demonstrate the need for a significant change to raise
the possibility of military force as a means of protection. The first was in August 2012, when
Kofi Annan announced that he was stepping down as Peace Envoy following the failure of his
6-point peace plan. At this point more than 10,000 people (mostly civilians) had been killed
over approximately 17 months.283 At this point, the international community was faced with
the possibility that peaceful means which appeared to be viable had been exhausted. Annan
had been appointed as the joint Arab League/United Nations Peace Envoy in February/March
2012 and his peace plan had received overtures of intended good-faith engagement from the
participants, in particular the Assad regime.284 The United Nations Supervision Mission in
Syria (‘UNSMIS’) was established as an unarmed peacekeeping mission in April 2012, in
support of Annan’s plan, with a mandate to ‘monitor a cessation of armed violence in all its
forms by all parties’.285 However, within a matter of months it was evident that the parties’
commitment to the peace process was limited. In July 2012, Russia and China vetoed a
proposed UNSC Resolution which intended to place weight (sanctions) behind the peace
process and send ‘a clear signal to all parties that their commitments [to the peace process]
were binding’.286
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The reasons for the repeated exercise of the veto regarding Syria are complex and multifaceted.287 What is clear, however, is that the lack of substantive support behind the peace plan
undermined its efficacy. Annan explicitly attributed its failure to the persistent UNSC
divisions,288 and the lack of international commitment to resolve the humanitarian crisis.289
Whatever the reasons for the consistent exercise of the veto within the UNSC,290 the effect was
that it appears to have left the Assad regime confident that intervention (forceful or otherwise)
would not occur.
Despite the overt failure of the peace process and the scope of the continued violence in Syria,
it is likely that August 2012 did not meet the requisite level of seriousness to legitimise use of
force under R2P. The reason was that the criteria of necessity (exhaustion of, or unlikely
success of non-forceful means) could not be met. While the attempted non-forceful measures
had in fact been unsuccessful in resolving the crisis, this was not because peaceful measures
were unsuitable. Annan in his resignation statement said:
The bloodshed continues, most of all because of the Syrian government’s intransigence … Without
serious, purposeful and united international pressure, including from the powers of the region, it is
impossible for me, or anyone, to compel the Syrian government in the first place, and also the opposition,
to take the steps necessary to begin a political process.291

It is important here to distinguish between the ‘humanitarian necessity’ which triggers
intervention of the non-forceful kind under the principle of R2P and the just war criteria of
necessity (and proportionality) which determines whether the use of force is the legitimate form
of intervention in response to a particular humanitarian crisis. The two are intertwined, but the
significant concern is the latter. There was little dispute, even from those exercising the veto,
that a humanitarian crisis was occurring.292 The debate concerned who was to blame and what
action was appropriate.
Far from legitimising the use of force, it is clear that there was a strong position that peaceful
measures could be successful if supported by the UNSC. In addition to the Kofi Annan plan
and UNSC supported UNSMIS, a range of non-forceful political and economic measures were
being attempted by individual states, 293 regional organisations, 294 and other organs of the
UN.295 Whilst these measures proved ineffective in bringing an end to the crisis, in August of
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2012, and with the lack of overt Syrian condemnation from China and Russia, it would appear
that they were more viable options than using force.296
The lack of necessity for force in August 2012 is further supported by the lack of overt
enthusiasm for such measures amongst the international community. In seeking to establish
evidence of state practice and opinio juris with regard to R2P the key factor is not that states
did not use force at this time, but that force was not a widely supported option. The proposed
resolutions tended to be rejected because they ‘failed to adequately address violence emanating
from Syrian opposition groups, did not explicitly rule out military intervention, and would not
help to resolve the situation on the ground’.297
The lack of enthusiasm for military measures could be attributed to the international
community preferring a Russian and Chinese supported outcome.298 It could also be said to
reflect the presumption against the use of force in the international system and the reality that
once started, armed force changes the situation without necessarily resolving it.299 Force may
indeed ‘inflame, rather than improve [the situation]’ and worsen the harm for those most at
risk.300 Consequently, while the Syrian situation in August 2012 may have been sufficiently
serious to warrant forceful intervention, the non-forceful measures had not been given the
opportunity to succeed and thus force at this point would likely not meet the just war criteria.
The second incident that could have potentially triggered use of force was the confirmation of
the use of chemical weapons within Syria in August-September 2013.301 Unlike 2012, the
spectre of military action was present in 2013 and (despite claims to the contrary) likely played
a role in gaining Syrian agreement and cooperation with the negotiated measures. 302
The involvement of chemical weapons in the conflict had long been characterised by US
President Obama as a ‘red line.’303 In August 2012 (prior to allegations of chemical weapon
usage) he stated:
I have, at this point, not ordered military engagement in the situation. But the point that you made about
chemical and biological weapons is critical … We have been very clear to the Assad regime, but also to
other players on the ground, that a red line for us is [when] we start seeing a whole bunch of chemical
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weapons moving around or being utilized. That would change my calculus. That would change my
equation.304

In August 2013 it was confirmed that chemical weapons had been used in Syria, and had been
used against civilians. Whilst the UN Mission Reports did not explicitly attribute their use to
the Assad regime, 305 many other sources did. 306 The Assad regime’s offered explanation,
accepted by Russia, was that insurgents had used the chemical weapons, but conceded the
Government did hold previously denied stockpiles of chemical weapons. 307 Even on the
interpretation of the information that is most generous to the Assad regime, they admitted to
the possession of chemical weapons stockpiles308 and conceded that chemical weapons had
been used in the conflict, whilst denying direct responsibility for their use.309 This at least
suggests that the Assad regime had lost control over their territory to an extent that they were
unable to protect the citizens subject to the attack.
The chemical weapons evidence in turn served to demonstrate the Syrian crisis had escalated
beyond the already recognised civilian tragedy that had persisted since 2011. Those in favour
of utilising use of force to intervene and bring an end to the conflict pinpointed this as evidence
of a significant escalation. Further, unlike 2012, an increasing number of states and
organisations called on the UNSC to take definitive action, up to and including the use of
force,310 with some indicating a willingness, even a responsibility, to act notwithstanding the
absence of an authorisation.311 The requisite level of seriousness required to legitimise force
was, therefore, at least closer than it had been 12 months previously. The issue of authority in
the absence of a UNSC resolution is discussed below. Here, the question must be asked, if
over 100,000 deaths occur over a two year period, and there is evidence of state willingness to
use chemical weapons against the civilian population (or failure to prevent the use of chemical
weapons against the civilian population), is not sufficiently serious to justify use of force under
R2P, then what is?
Key to understanding the requisite level of seriousness (necessity and proportionality) criteria,
is remembering that R2P is not punitive. The call for military action must be viewed within
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the context of the regime’s continuing failure to protect civilians and the seriousness of the
threat against them. Consequently, the specific examples of the use of chemical weapons are
significant in as much as they represent that the risk to civilians had escalated with the parties
to the conflict both in possession of and willing to use chemical weapons.
Chemical weapons fall into the category of ‘weapons of mass destruction’ and it has been
suggested, their use against populations can be distinguished from the broader humanitarian
crisis when assessing the necessity and proportionality of action.312 The use of such weapons
draws analogies to genocide and crimes against humanity because their use represents a
‘singular disrespect for human life.’ 313 Then Australian Prime Minister Kevin Rudd drew
analogies with two of the 1990s’ most visible failures of the international system to ‘protect’,
Srebrenica and Rwanda.314
The ultimate form of the non-forceful resolution to the threatened use of force - which focused
on removing the ability for such weapons to be used again - further supports the suggestion
that the use of chemical weapons against civilians reached the requisite level of seriousness to
legitimise military action. The Russian-negotiated accession of Syria to the Convention on
Chemical Weapons315 and the entry of inspectors from the Organisation for the Prohibition of
Chemical Weapons (‘OPCW’) were viewed as removing the threat of further chemical
weapons use, or at least greatly decreasing the likelihood of further use. 316 Almost
immediately the threat of military action ceased. The attacks on civilians and the mass
humanitarian crisis did not. The 2013 agreement did not end the conflict and international
oversight may have deterred further use of chemical weapons, but it did not halt the suffering.
The responsibility to protect the Syrian citizens did not end with the chemical weapons
agreement. However, keeping in mind the risk of escalation which could result from military
action, a peaceful settlement was clearly preferable.
Further, the Assad regime’s co-operation on this one point, albeit against the backdrop of
potential intervention should they not accede, suggested a willingness to more
comprehensively engage with the international community. The regime reluctantly opened its
borders to UN officials and the scrutiny/destruction of their chemical weapons stockpile.
Consequently, whilst the humanitarian necessity remained present, the temporary success of
non-forceful means in relation to this specific form of escalation made military intervention
less necessary as a form of resolution.
3 Authority to Intervene
From the beginning of the Syrian crisis it has been absolutely clear that there would be no
UNSC authorisation to utilise military force in Syria. R2P’s current implementation limits
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were demonstrated by China and Russia vetoing any R2P military intervention in Syria (and
many non-military strategies). 317 The reasons for this refusal to implement R2P are
multifaceted and complex. Most interesting are the stated ideological objections to
international intervention within the borders of a sovereign state and the concern over the
establishment of a precedent legitimising future action.
Before examining the ideological reasons for the blocking of the UNSC resolutions, selfinterest, in particular Russia’s long-standing relationship with the Assad regime,318 must be
acknowledged as playing a role in the decision not to support R2P interventions. The economic
and political interests of the veto powers surely influenced their decision not to support
intervention. This long-standing relationship, and recognition of the risks associated with
international military intervention likely motivated the negotiations that led to a successful
resolution to the chemical weapons crisis.319 Whilst the situation-specific interests of the veto
powers will remain a barrier to UNSC authorisation of R2P’s effective use in the future, this is
hardly a new phenomenon and is the reason that considering the legitimacy of non-UNSC
authorised use of force is particularly important. The concern is whether the refusal to support
action is merely self-interested or reflects a broader ideological concern with putting the
principle into practice.320
Countries, including South Africa and Russia, were particularly critical of authorising R2P
force in Syria, seeking to avoid any action which could allow an attempt at ‘regime change’ by
Western States.321 Heavy criticism of the Assad regime and implied support for the opposition
raised concern that there was an ulterior motive to the call for forceful measures. 322 R2P
operates on the presumption of state sovereignty, reserving the first responsibility to each state
to respond to threats within their own borders. The anti-interventionists were wary about taking
action within the borders of Syria which could expressly or impliedly affect the sovereignty of
the state.323 As discussed above, the failure of a regime to the extent of permitting (or failing
to respond to) crimes against humanity within their borders, legitimises international scrutiny
and even intervention, proportionate to their failure. Non-consensual intervention implies
either a presumed global secondary responsibility for the crisis or complete failure of the
regime as part of sovereignty. Either implication would suggest regime change was at least
desirable if not inevitable.
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The anti-interventionists’ concerns are not without merit. While state authorities tended to
focus on the undeniable humanitarian crisis, there was also clear advocacy in favour of
delegitimising the Assad regime,324 although care was taken not to advocate regime change.325
The language of ‘punishment’ in many reports further reflected the suggestion that any use of
force, while justified by R2P, may have had alternative motivations.326 Such language and
apparent motivations also could be said to have impacted on the willingness of the Assad
regime to co-operate and accept non-forceful international assistance.
Further, a lesson learned from the Libyan intervention was that even where the UNSC
authorises only minimal intervention, once military action is occurring it can rapidly open the
door to more extensive change.327 An initial series of targeted military strikes may be the
intended scope of action (eg, destruction of storage facilities or delivery mechanisms in order
to bring an end to the means of the worst atrocities without regime change), but the likelihood
of escalation and broader military action is high.
R2P imposes a significant burden of proof on the international community at large (and those
advocating intervention specifically) to demonstrate the manifest failure of the state to meet its
sovereign obligations. While there remain concerns that pseudo-imperialistic tendencies could
lead to R2P’s misuse in promoting Western interests and Western desire for regime change,328
these are arguably mitigated by the need for significant evidence from bodies beyond the
interventionists’ own intelligence services.329 Ideally, individual states would not need to rely
on R2P to justify their own action. The culmination of evidence (of both cause and
proportionality) would compel the UNSC to take action. R2P is not a panacea for UNSC
inaction. Instead it asks the international community, not merely those currently members of
the UNSC, to refrain from treating the intervening state as a wrongdoer.
In Syria, repeated reports from UN and other agencies pointed to the failures of the Syrian State
to meet its obligations. At the very least the Assad regime had, as mentioned above, ‘manifestly
failed to protect’. 330 Refusal to support UNSC action on the grounds of Syrian (Assad)
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sovereignty alone appears to reject the very nature of R2P as universal in its scope. However,
given the widespread acceptance of the principle in the early-mid 2000s, it is difficult to argue
that the UNSC lacks authority to intervene contrary to the will of the Government that has
failed so manifestly to protect its citizens.331
The UNSC veto problem,332 demonstrates why further evolution of R2P is necessary.333 Even
the UNSC in a 2014 Resolution, did not go past recognising R2P’s first pillar (that Syrian
authorities have primary responsibility for citizen protection).334 While recognising Syria’s
situation as destabilising the region, a humanitarian crisis, and that there were breaches of
international law, the UNSC deferred from making more definitive statements with regard to
the international community’s responsibilities in relation to the crisis or the regime’s failure,
legitimising intrusion into its sovereign autonomy.335 This demonstrates that the other two
pillars of R2P had not yet reached sufficient state support to be representative of customary
international law.
In assessing whether intervention could have occurred at either of the points above (or could
occur in future) under the two interpretations of R2P, it is important to note that in relation to
Resolution 2139 ‘sole protection’ was not used to describe the Syrian State’s protection role.
The activities described in UNSC resolution’s preamble,336 were also likely to fall into R2P’s
ascribed crimes under the Rome Statute. 337 The UNSC has been willing to state that
occurrences in Syria ‘may’ be classed as war crimes and crimes against humanity;338 this muted
language is appropriate given the role international courts now possess.
Russia, in particular, has blocked any attempts to expressly attribute responsibility to the Assad
regime, preferring to emphasise the allegations against those who the regime are fighting.339
While it is almost certain that atrocities have been undertaken by those fighting the regime,
surely by this point, with over 150,000 dead and millions displaced,340 the direct responsibility
of the Assad regime becomes redundant in assessing what action the international community
ought to take. The regime’s failure to bring an end to the suffering and their failure to seek
substantive assistance under the second pillar undermines their sovereign claim to noninterference and legitimises strong international action of some kind; even if military action is
not seen as the appropriate action to take.
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Under the present system, disagreement and deadlock, such as for Syria, is the likely norm.341
It is logically inconsistent to recognise on one hand that the international community has
responsibility to respond to atrocities, and on the other hand, prevent its members from
responding. Reliance on the UNSC as the sole authority for R2P action will stagnate the
development of the principle and atrocities will continue unabated.
An interesting aside, which is beyond the scope of this article, is that little consideration appears
to have been given to the extent to which the actions of those who advocated intervention in
Syria could constitute a threat to use force. The art 2(4) prohibition is, of course, on the threat
as much as the use of force. Consequently, if the use of force in 2013 would have exceeded
the limits of R2P, so too would the threat have been unlawful.342 Whilst there is a concern with
coercing a state to respond, raising the possibility of using force as a means of international
(humanitarian) law enforcement, without parallel action (gathering of troops) to add weight to
the oral threat, would appear not to fall within the threshold.343 In addition, the perceived
absence of any weight behind the 2012 Annan Peace Plan is, as mentioned above, a key
explanation for its failure. On the other hand, the likelihood that the US and its allies would
act without UNSC authority certainly played a role in achieving an outcome in 2013. Thus,
while non-intervention is still the norm in R2P the door to non-UNSC sanctioned action is
slowly creeping open.344

V

CONCLUSIONS

R2P developed in response to the failure of legal mechanisms to adequately prevent and
respond to atrocities in the late 20th and early 21st centuries. The political machinations and
self-interest, combined with the availability of political veto, means the UNSC has a history of
failing to protect civilian populations suffering at the hands of violent regimes. Given that
UNSC reform is unlikely, the R2P process allows states to legitimise their use of force against
those responsible for the most heinous of rights abuses, with the requirement that abuses be of
a requisite level of seriousness, and that use of force be reserved as a last resort. As a standard
of legitimacy rather than legality, states intervening under the banner of R2P are faced with the
challenge of providing the international community with sufficient evidence to justify the
action as sufficiently necessary; both in terms of cause and the scope of response.
In Libya, the developing principle of R2P would appear to have influenced the UNSC decision
to act, but that decision - and indeed R2P’s exact role - remains controversial. When faced
with the Syrian crisis, the UNSC was hampered by political interests and a reticence to ‘act
against’ the sovereignty of the Syrian regime. The UNGA ‘Uniting for Peace’ procedures
established in 1950, 345 allow the UNGA to recommend appropriate collective measures in
response to situations of international peace and security where political deadlock has
prevented the UNSC from acting.346 However, the procedure cannot direct action to be taken,
341

Garwood-Gowers, above n 281, 595.
MA Myers, ‘Deterrence and the threat of force ban: Does the UN Charter Prohibit some Military Exercises’
(1999) 162 Military Law Review 132; Oscar Schachter, ‘Rights of States to Use Armed Force’ (1984) 82 Michigan
Law Review 1620, 1625-27.
343
Myers, above n 342, 143.
344
International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, above n 99, 31.
345
Uniting for Peace, GA Res 377(V)A, UN GAOR, 5th sess, Agenda Item 68, UN Doc A/Res/377(V)A (3
November 1950).
346
Ibid, preamble.
342

170

FROM CAUSE TO RESPONSIBILITY

nor can it ‘authorise’ such action.347 Affirmation by the UNGA would certainly give specific
action ‘a high degree of legitimacy’,348 but as yet does not change the legality of a particular
use of force. Further, the UNGA method comes with its own challenges and was criticised by
the ICISS, as the required two thirds majority is politically unlikely if there is a UNSC deadlock
or veto.349 Further, the R2P responsibility is imposed on all states – not on the institution of
the UNGA.
R2P’s creation highlighted a division between legitimate and legal action. R2P, as adopted
formally by the global community in the World Summit outcome, requires UNSC approval
and has resulted in a negative impact on the doctrines’ development; as was highlighted by
analysing the Libyan civil war and the Syrian uprising. Only R2P’s first pillar, that primary
responsibility lies with the state, is consistently accepted internationally. While just war theory
was ostensibly replaced when the UN Charter supplanted debates on the legality of use of
force, this article has demonstrated that just war theory remains relevant in guiding state actions
in the absence of clear legal rules. In the context of the UNSC’s recognised limitations in
responding to atrocities, just war principles provide guidance for the appropriateness of nonUNSC authorised R2P intervention. Placing the responsibility (as opposed to a right) to act
within the existing context of just war theory, demonstrates that proportionality and last resort
have remained constant factors in the legitimisation of humanitarian-motivated military action.
These factors remain relevant within the present UN system, with states formally obliged to
seek peaceful resolution before utilising a use of force exception. Bearing in mind that it was
preventable atrocities and the global community’s inaction which triggered the creation of the
R2P concept initially, the continued occurrence of such atrocities suggests that states need to
take further steps forward.
The modern reality of global state interdependence requires that states should utilise
intervening force acceptable within the UN system when required, either through being a
secondary authority or when the breaching ‘state’ no longer meets the requirements of
sovereignty in the UN system. States are operating in an uncertain international environment
in which the legal rules – including those regarding the use of force - are evolving. While it is
easy to say that the UN Charter system places a strong legal prohibition on the use of force,
subject only to defined exceptions, the reality is somewhat less clear. Action is taken within a
spectrum not merely of legality but legitimacy and R2P operates to give an intervening State’s
actions more or less legitimacy. It remains to be seen whether R2P will ultimately gain
certainty as a legal principle. Lacking a clear, authoritative statement of R2P as a legal
exception to the general prohibition, it is necessary to look to the dual elements of customary
international law to determine R2P’s status. Whilst not yet clearly meeting the standard of
opino juris the state practice seen in Kosovo and the changed political dynamics seen
supporting the initial intervention in Libya, show that R2P has growing recognition. It is clear
that, as with the just war principle, R2P currently serves to guide decisions on the legitimacy
of action. It is equally clear that through its continued use and relevance to crimes occurring
today, there is a strong foundation for R2P to develop into a true exception to the prohibition
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on the use of force, allowing the possibility of force in response to heinous crimes – with or
without UNSC authorisation.
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